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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RICHARD MCDONALD, 
Plaintiff,
v.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE; 
COLONEL FRANK PAWLOWSKI, 
Commissioner of Pennsylvania State Police 
In his official capacity; MAJOR JOHN 
GALLAHER, In his individual capacity,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
) 02:09 -  cv -  00442
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Presently before the Court is DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 46). The issues have been fully briefed (Document Nos. 47 and 56). 
The parties have also developed their respective positions regarding the Concise Statements of 
Material Facts and have submitted numerous exhibits (Document Nos. 48, 49, 57, 58, 59). The 
summary judgment motion is ripe for disposition.1
Factual and Procedural Background
The Court appreciates the extensive appendix provided by Plaintiff Richard McDonald 
(hereinafter “Plaintiff’ or “McDonald”), which sets forth the background and chronology of the 
dispute. Although the Court recognizes that Defendants have not had the opportunity to respond
1 Also pending before the Court is DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO 
RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF’S L.R. 56.1.C.1(c) MATERIAL FACTS (Document No. 60). This 
motion will be DENIED AS MOOT as a reply is unnecessary.
AUTHENTICATED , 
U.S. GOVERNMENT^ 
INFORMATION -
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to Plaintiff’s additional facts, at the summary judgment stage of the case all facts and reasonable 
inferences therefrom must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.
Defendant Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) is an agency of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. The PSP, among other things, administers the Municipal Police Officers 
Education and Training Commission (“MPOETC”), a twenty member commission charged with 
the responsibility to establish and administer training and certification of police officers. 53 
Pa.C.S.A. § 2164. In order to serve as a police officer in a municipal police department, the 
officer must be certified by MPOETC pursuant to Act 120. Defendant Pawlawski was the 
Commissioner of the PSP and served as the Chairman of MPOETC by virtue of that position. 53 
Pa.C.S.A. § 2163. Defendant Gallaher served as the Executive Director of MPOETC and 
administered the program and staff of fifteen people on a daily basis. MPOETC administrative 
officer Beverly Young, certification unit supervisor Judy Herr and application processor Erica 
Aikens were more directly involved in processing applications for certification.
Plaintiff has, throughout his career, been employed in various law enforcement capacities 
in Pennsylvania. Between 1989 and 2002, Plaintiff was employed by the City of Pittsburgh 
Bureau of Police as a uniformed officer, a member of the drug task force and as a detective in the 
homicide unit. As a Pittsburgh Police officer, Plaintiff was certified by MPOETC as having 
fulfilled the necessary education and training requirements to serve in that capacity. Following 
his tenure as a Pittsburgh Police officer, Plaintiff was employed by the Pennsylvania Office of 
Attorney General as a “Special Agent II” from 2002 to 2006. Act 120 certification was not 
required for McDonald’s employment with the Commonwealth and his certification lapsed.
2
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In December 2002, McDonald suffered a work-related automobile accident, in which he 
sustained a herniated disc at L5-S1. He continued to perform his duties as a special agent for 
approximately one year after the accident. Due to chronic pain, McDonald had lumbar 
decompression and fusion surgery in November 2003. After the surgery, McDonald attempted 
to resume his duties as a special agent, but was unable to do so, and his employment was 
eventually terminated.2 In July 2006, McDonald had additional surgery to remove the pedicle 
screw and other hardware that had been implanted in the original surgery. McDonald received 
additional therapy, a continuing course of pain management therapy, and his condition began to 
improve.
As a direct result of his injuries, Plaintiff was lawfully prescribed the narcotic pain 
reliever Avinza. At all relevant times, he was prescribed a stable dosage of 60 mg per day. 
McDonald testified that, with Avinza, he has no physical limitations that would prevent him 
from performing the duties of a police officer. He can bend, handcuff a suspect who is lying on 
the ground, lift a person, and subdue a person. McDonald is limited only as to the ability to sit in 
a car for hours on end or to stand in one place for an extended period of time. As McDonald 
explained, the Avinza helps to minimize the pain from his nerve damage so that he is able to 
perform his life activities.
In May 2007, the Borough of Ellwood City, Pennsylvania (the “Borough”) offered 
Plaintiff the position of Police Chief. In order to serve in that capacity, Plaintiff was required to 
be re-certified by MPOETC. On August 20, 2007, Plaintiff and the Borough entered into an 
employment agreement and Plaintiff commenced work as the Chief of Police for the Borough.
2 McDonald filed suit, alleging that he had not received appropriate accommodation of his back 
injury.
3
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In June/July 2007 and again in April 2008, the Borough of Ellwood City requested that 
MPOETC re-certify Plaintiff as a police officer.
The MPOETC application contained a Physical Examination report completed by Dr. 
Andrew Margolis on May 25, 2007, which stated that McDonald was physically fit to be 
certified as a police officer. The MPOETC application also contained a Psychological Report 
dated June 5, 2007 by Julie Uran, Ph.D., Psychologist. Dr. Uran opined that there was “no 
indication that would preclude [McDonald] from execution of duties as a police officer to 
include weapon usage.” The Report noted McDonald’s car accident and resultant back pain, but 
did not specifically address the use of Avinza.
On July 16, 2007, MPOETC notified the Borough that McDonald had passed the 
Certification Exam and, upon receipt of a completed application with required documentation, he 
would be recommended for certification as a police officer as a “waiver of training” applicant.
On October 12, 2007, MPOETC notified the Borough that the Commission had decided to deny 
certification. The letter explained that based on the documents reviewed by the medical advisor 
to the Commission, McDonald did not have the physical capacity to perform the essential job 
tasks of a police officer without medical restriction. The “medical advisor” was Darby Hand, 
D.O., FACP, a PSP medical officer. In a two-page email on October 2, 2007 to Judy Herr, Dr. 
Hand explained his rationale for concluding that McDonald was physically unable to perform the 
duties of a police officer. In essence, Dr. Hand credited the consensus of three pre-2006 
neurosurgeon independent medical examiners (“IMEs”) that McDonald had reached Maximum 
Medical Improvement (“MMI”) and was limited to light or medium-light duty as a result of the 
car accident. Dr. Hand found it “difficult to believe” the contrary opinion expressed by Dr.
4
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Margolis in his May 2007 Physical Examination report. Dr. Hand did not reference McDonald’s 
use of Avinza.
In response to the denial of certification, McDonald sent a letter to MPOETC on October 
22, 2007 in which he sought reconsideration of its decision, offered to provide updated medical 
records and/or undergo an IME at his own cost, and inquired into his right to a hearing. On 
November 26, 2007, an attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel to the PSP notified McDonald 
that he had no right to a hearing.
On January 9, 2008, as a result of MPOETC’s refusal to provide certification under Act 
120, the Borough demoted McDonald to the position of Chief of Operations, a position with 
lower pay and benefits. The Borough suggested this arrangement because it wanted McDonald 
to remain in the job. The parties re-negotiated a two-year contract under which McDonald 
performed very similar day-to-day activities at the police department.
On March 12, 2008, Charles H. Ziegler, D.O., performed a Functional Performance 
Evaluation and opined that McDonald was capable of performing the essential demands of the 
Police Chief job. Dr. Ziegler noted the prior surgeries and some residual radiculopathy in the left 
leg, but concluded that McDonald had “no functional limitations.” Dr. Ziegler did not address 
the use of Avinza. McDonald forwarded the IME to Beverly Young on April 12, 2008. On 
April 17, 2008, Dr. Uran performed another Psychological Examination and prepared a Report. 
Dr. Uran opined that McDonald was psychologically capable of exercising appropriate judgment 
and restraint to be certified as a police officer. Dr. Uran further stated: “There is no indication 
that would preclude him from execution of duties as a police officer or engaging in lethal
5
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weapon usage.” She averred that her report was submitted “with the highest degree of 
psychological certainty.”
On June 9, 2008, Dr. Hand sent another memorandum to Judy Herr which addressed Dr.
Ziegler’s medical opinion and explained the basis for Dr. Hand’s continued belief that McDonald
was not fit to serve as a police officer. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 23. For the purpose of summary
judgment, the Court will assume that Dr. Hand misinterpreted Dr. Ziegler’s evaluation of
McDonald’s physical capabilities. In addition, Dr. Hand continued to emphasize the lack of
documentation to explain how McDonald’s condition could have substantially improved since
2006, when three IME’s had opined that he was disabled.
On July 8, 2008, MPOETC selected Dr. John Levy to perform another IME to evaluate
McDonald’s physical capabilities. On August 13, 2008, after reviewing medical records and
performing a physical examination, Dr. Levy opined that McDonald was “capable of tolerating a
full duty position as police chief as well as performing the essential tasks of a police officer.”
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5. Dr. Levy then stated:
My only concern is the patient does take oral narcotics on a daily basis. However,
I will state that by report he has not taken increasing doses. He has taken a stable 
amount for the past year. In my opinion, I believe that he would be capable of 
performing his duties, taking narcotics on a daily basis, as long as this is 
supervised by a specialized pain management physician, such as Dr. Weidner, 
who currently takes care of Mr. McDonald. I am unaware of the police policy 
referable to the use of prescribed narcotics in the workplace. If in fact they are 
allowed, I believe that Mr. McDonald is capable of reentering the workplace as a 
police officer full time, full duty without restrictions. If there is any concern in 
terms of his mental abilities referable to the use of narcotics, certainly cognitive 
testing through psychological testing could be considered. Based on his 
presentation today, my opinion is that Mr. McDonald is fit for duty as the police 
chief of Ellwood City Police Department and capable of performing all the 
essential tasks of a police officer.
6
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On September 2, 2008, Dr. Hand sent another memorandum to Beverly Young, which 
expressed his analysis of Dr. Levy’s IME.3 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4. Dr. Hand acknowledged that 
Dr. Levy opined that McDonald was fit for duty, but for the first time, focused on the use of 
Avinza. Dr. Hand recognized that McDonald was under the care of a pain control physician and 
that there was no evidence that he was abusing Avinza. On the other hand, Dr. Hand was 
concerned that Avinza was a long acting oral form of morphine with numerous reported potential 
side effects. Dr. Hand stated that if a member of the PSP “were to take this drug for a legitimate 
reason they would be excluded from any critical duty and placed on medically limited duty until 
such time as they no longer used this drug.” Dr. Hand believed that chronic use of Avinza could 
result in a cognitive deficit and he was “not able to say that Mr. McDonald would be able to 
function in the capacity of a certified municipal police officer who is engaged in the day to day 
tasks of law enforcement in which coherent, quick and precise decision making is paramount.”
In summary, Dr. Hand opined:
I am mightily resistant (emphasis in original) to the assertion, or belief, that they 
would be able to respond appropriately in situations that require split second 
thinking and instantaneous action to protect themselves and the public. I believe 
it to be imprudent to allow Mr. McDonald to be certified as a municipal police 
officer while using this medication.
Dr. Hand did not know whether McDonald actually suffered from any of the potential side 
effects of Avinza and he acknowledged that no physical or mental side effects had been reported. 
Nevertheless, as set forth in a letter dated October 14, 2008, MPOETC continued to withhold Act 
120 certification “because of his daily use of Avinza, a prescription narcotic, and its potential
3 Defendant Gallaher is copied on Young’s request to Dr. Hand for an updated opinion, but is not 
copied on any of Dr. Hand’s responses. The record reflects that Gallaher had only a tangential, 
supervisory role in the processing of McDonald’s application.
7
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side effects . . . .” Counsel for McDonald made another request for a hearing on October 28, 
2008. On October 30, 2008, Lisa A. Weidner, M.D., opined that McDonald had been stable on 
his present medications, had demonstrated no side effects from the Avinza and was 
“neurologically intact and functioning fully cognitively.” Dr. Weidner had no concerns that 
McDonald would have any limitations due to his chronic pain or the medications prescribed for 
treating that pain. On November 14, 2008, MPOETC again advised counsel that McDonald was 
not entitled to a hearing.
McDonald’s contract as Chief of Operations with the Borough expired on December 31, 
2008. Pursuant to a settlement agreement,4 McDonald remained on a “leave of absence” for the 
entire 2009 calendar year. McDonald is now employed doing investigative services for the 
Travelers Group.
The Complaint in this case was filed by Plaintiff on April 15, 2009 and asserts the 
following claims: (1) a violation of the Rehabilitation Act by the Pennsylvania State Police 
(“PSP”); (2) a violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by Defendant 
Pawlowski in his official capacity as Commissioner of the PSP; and (3) a Due Process violation 
by Defendant Gallaher in his individual capacity. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, 
injunctive relief -- including an Order that Defendants certify Plaintiff as a police officer -- and 
attorneys fees and costs.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary judgment. In interpreting Rule 56,
4 McDonald had filed an EEOC charge against the mayor of Ellwood City.
8
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the United States Supreme Court has stated:
The plain language . . . mandates entry of summary judgment, after adequate time 
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and 
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there 
can be “no genuine issue as to material fact,” since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily 
renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U S. 317, 322-323 (1986).
An issue of material fact is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). The court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and
the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists rests with the movant.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The "existence of disputed issues of material fact should be
ascertained by resolving all inferences, doubts and issues of credibility against the moving
party.” Ely v. Hall's Motor Transit Co., 590 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting Smith v.
Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1972)). Final credibility
determinations on material issues cannot be made in the context of a motion for summary
judgment, nor can the district court weigh the evidence. Josey v. John R  Hollingsworth Corp.,
996 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1993); Petruzzi'sIGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993).
When the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party's
burden can be “discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the District Court—that there is
an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the
moving party has fulfilled this responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who
cannot rest on the allegations of the pleadings and must “do more than simply show that there is
9
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some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Petruzzi'sIGA Supermarkets, 998 F.2d at 1230. When the 
non-moving party's evidence in opposition to a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” the court may grant summary 
judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250.
Legal Analysis
MPOETC is empowered under Pennsylvania law to certify whether or not a candidate 
has the physical and mental ability to serve as a police officer. MPOETC concluded that 
McDonald should not receive such certification due to his long-term use of the narcotic drug 
Avinza. Plaintiff points to evidence from numerous medical professionals who have opined that 
he is physically and mentally capable of performing the duties and responsibilities of a police 
chief and suffers no side effects from Avinza. Nevertheless, MPOETC has adhered to a rigid 
position that use of Avinza prevents McDonald from being certified. In essence, Plaintiff is 
asking the Court (or a jury) to override MPOETC’s certification decision.
ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
McDonald alleges that Defendants regarded him as physically and/or cognitively disabled 
due to his back injury and use of Avinza. Defendants contend that the ADA and Rehabilitation 
Act claims are barred by sovereign immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Defendants also contend that the Rehabilitation Act claim must fail because 
MPOETC receives no federal funding. Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot show
10
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that he has an actual disability, that he is otherwise qualified for the position of police officer, or 
that he is significantly restricted from performing a broad range of jobs. Plaintiff responds 
vigorously that his ADA claim for prospective relief is not barred pursuant to the Ex Parte Young 
doctrine and that Congress has abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12202. Plaintiff further argues that it is irrelevant that MPOETC does not directly receive 
federal funds because it is not a separate agency, but rather, is part of the PSP, which does 
receive federal funds. Finally, Plaintiff contends that there are a multitude of factual disputes as 
to whether he is a qualified person with a physical or cognitive disability, whether Defendants 
regarded him as substantially limited in his ability to work and whether he was excluded from a 
broad class of jobs. Ultimately, McDonald seeks to convince a jury that MPOETC was simply 
wrong in its refusal to certify him to perform the job of police chief.
The Court need not resolve these disputes because there is a foundational flaw in these 
claims. Specifically, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently 
rejected very similar ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims and held that MPOETC is not a 
“covered entity.”
In Lekich v. Pawlowski, 361 Fed. Appx. 322 (3d Cir. January 15, 2010) (Smith, J.) (non­
precedential), a police officer candidate had completed the police training program and received 
an offer of employment from a borough police department, contingent upon MPOETC 
certification. The examining physician determined that Lekich was color-blind, in contravention 
of MPOETC certification requirements. The employment offer was then rescinded. Lekich 
secured another doctor’s opinion that the color perception problem would not interfere with his 
ability to perform the job of a police officer and sought to have MPOETC either waive the vision
11
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requirement or consider the new medical opinion. MPOETC refused, because the application 
packet had been withdrawn by the borough. As in this case, the conduct at issue occurred prior 
to January 1, 2009, the effective date of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”).5
Lekich filed claims under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, Section 1983 and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act against Pawlowski, in his official capacity as Chairman of 
MPOETC. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant on all claims and the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Our Appeals Court held that “MPOETC did not 
violate the non-discrimination in employment provisions of the ADA because it is not subject to 
them.” Id. at 326. The Court explained that MPOETC is not a “covered entity” as defined in 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(2), but “is merely a governmental body that certifies that an applicant has or has 
not met certain preordained guidelines when a police department -  an employer -  directs it to 
process an application.” Id. at 325-26. The Court recognized that the same analysis was 
dispositive of the Rehabilitation Act claim because employment discrimination claims under the 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act are governed by the same standards. Id. at 326 (citing29 U.S.C. § 
794(d)).
The analysis in Lekich, while not binding precedent, is certainly persuasive. McDonald’s 
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims suffer from the same shortcomings as those of Lekich. 
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), the term “covered entity” means “an employer, employment 
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.” MPOETC is not a “covered 
entity” and, thus, is not subject to the ADA discrimination provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
The PSP is even further removed from the employment decision, as it is merely the state agency
5 In Britting v. Secretary, Dept. Of Veterans Affairs, Slip Copy, 2011 WL 300240 (3d Cir. 
February 1, 2011), the Court of Appeals held that the ADAAA is not retroactive.
12
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under which MPOETC is organized, see 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2164, and had no direct role in the 
matters at issue. The claim against Pawlowski in his “official capacity” is merely an alternative 
method of pleading an action against the PSP. Lekich, 361 Fed. Appx. at 325 (citingKoslow v. 
Commonwealth o f Pa., 302 F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002)). In sum, neither the PSP nor 
Pawlawski, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the PSP, is a “covered entity” under the 
ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 
Counts I and II.
Section 1983 Due Process Claim
Plaintiff also asserts a Section 1983 claim against Defendant Gallaher in his personal 
capacity. McDonald alleges that his procedural due process rights were violated because 
MPOETC did not provide him with personal notice, a hearing, and/or the right to appeal. 
Defendants contend that McDonald’s due process rights were not implicated by the discretionary 
decision to deny certification; that he received appropriate notice; and that the only relief to 
which he arguably could be entitled is a hearing. Defendant further contends that Gallaher is 
entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff’s argument on the Section 1983 claim is very limited 
and does not discuss the evidentiary record.
There is no explicit formula for that which constitutes adequate protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citingMathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)). McDonald’s interest in continued 
employment must be balanced against the interest of Pennsylvania in providing physically and 
mentally qualified individuals to serve as police officers. The Court noted in its October 2, 2009
13
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Opinion that Defendants had made “compelling arguments” to dismiss the due process claim but 
concluded that it was premature at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceeding.
MPOETC and McDonald engaged in an interactive process which extended over fifteen 
months. The regulation governing notice, 37 Pa.Code § 203.13, provides that MPOETC will 
supply written verification “to the applicant's employing police department” rather than the 
individual applicant. In any event, the record reflects that McDonald received actual notice of 
each of the decisions of MPOETC to deny certification, and the basis for those decisions.
Moreover, McDonald’s application received extensive “process.” In Wilson, which 
involved an analogous issue regarding whether court security officers were medically qualified, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that appropriate “process” 
had been given:
After the appellants were termed medically disqualified, but before they were 
terminated, they were provided with notice of their medical disqualification and 
offered an opportunity to respond with medical documentation from their own 
doctors regarding their ability to perform their positions. While this is not a 
traditional hearing, the process afforded the appellants is sufficient given the 
balance of their interest in maintaining employment and the government's interest 
in security. A more rigorous process would not significantly enhance the accuracy 
of the medical qualification process. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893.
Therefore, the District Court correctly determined that the appellants were 
provided sufficient process.
Id. at 178-79. The same analysis applies to the factual record in this case. MPOETC’s review 
included exchanges of correspondence, consideration of the medical opinions and supplemental 
medical opinions provided by McDonald, the performance of an additional IME at MPOETC’s 
expense, and three separate analyses by Dr. Hand. The gravamen of McDonald’s theory is not 
that MPOETC ignored his evidence or failed to engage in an evaluation of his position. Rather, 
McDonald simply disagrees with MPOETC’s ultimate decision to deny certification. While
14
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there was no “traditional hearing,” McDonald had ample opportunity to provide documentation 
from his examining physicians. The Wilson Court held that this procedure was sufficient. Even 
assuming that McDonald had a protectable property interest in his continued employment by the 
Borough, there was no lack of “due process.”
In addition, the evidentiary record would not enable a reasonable jury to find Gallaher 
personally liable for an alleged deprivation of McDonald’s due process rights, as Gallaher acted 
primarily in a limited supervisory capacity. As the Speck Court observed: “A defendant in a 
civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be 
predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Id. at *7 (citing Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988)). In the alternative, a reasonable official in 
Gallaher’s position would not have known that his conduct violated McDonald’s due process 
rights. See Bayer v. Monroe County Children and Youth Services, 577 F.3d 186, 191-193 (3d 
Cir. 2009). Plaintiff has not identified any “clearly established” right to additional process. In 
accordance with Wilson, MPOETC’s process was appropriate. Moreover, in response to each 
request by McDonald for an administrative hearing, Gallaher obtained a legal opinion from the 
PSP Office of Chief Counsel that additional proceedings were not warranted. Thus, Gallaher is 
entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 
Count III.
Conclusion
Mr. McDonald is a litigant for whom the Court feels empathy. 
presented substantial evidence of his fitness to serve as a police chief.
He has certainly 
On the other hand,
15
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McDonald is asking the Court (or a jury) to substitute its own view of his fitness for that of 
MPOETC, the Commission created by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to perform that role. 
The Court need not resolve the difficult balancing of the individual and societal interests in this 
case because McDonald’s claims do not fit within the contours of the existing law.
In accordance with the foregoing, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 46) will be GRANTED. An appropriate order follows.
McVerry, J.
16
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RICHARD MCDONALD, 
Plaintiff,
v.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE; 
COLONEL FRANK PAWLOWSKI, 
Commissioner of Pennsylvania State Police 
In his official capacity; MAJOR JOHN 
GALLAHER, In his individual capacity,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
) 02:09 -  cv -  00442
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ORDER OF THE COURT
AND NOW, this 1st day of April, 2011, in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum 
Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 46) is GRANTED. DEFENDANTS’ 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF’S L.R. 56.1.C.1(c) 
MATERIAL FACTS (Document No. 60) is DENIED AS MOOT.
The clerk is directed to docket this case closed.
BY THE COURT:
s/Terrence F. McVerry 
United States District Court Judge
17
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cc: Timothy P. O’Brien, Esq.
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